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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PROCESS
OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH KOREA AND
TAIWAN UNTIL 2008**

by

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December 2017

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RELATIONS IN THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH KOREA
AND TAIWAN UNTIL 2008**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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(FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

This thesis compares the changes of civil-military relations during the democratization process in South Korea and Taiwan until 2008. It applies Narcis Serra's theory of military reform and civil-military relations. In *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*, Serra argues changes in civil-military relations occur along three axes: military professionalism, civilian control of the military, and tension between civilians and the military. This analysis shows that military professionalism and the civilian control of the military improved in both countries during the democratization process, but the degree of improvement in South Korea was higher than in Taiwan. Furthermore, the tension between the civilians and the military in Taiwan was higher than that of South Korea. The difference in civil-military relations between the two countries is attributed to different paths of democratization. In Taiwan, the democratization movement was initially less influential than in South Korea. Not only was the Taiwanese military more reluctant to reform, but also social pressure demanding reform was comparatively weak. In South Korea, the democratization movement was more forceful due to regular mass mobilization, while the military was more responsive to social pressures.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study compares how civil–military relations developed during the process of democratization in South Korea and Taiwan. This research has several meaningful characteristics.

First, this study examines historical similarities and differences between South Korea and Taiwan. During the 20th century, South Korea and Taiwan have undergone a similar process. Both countries had been invaded by imperialist Japan and have had experience fighting against communism. Also, they have had a close relationship with the United States. Furthermore, strong authoritarian regimes ruled the countries at the beginning of their national development, and since the late 1980s, both countries have taken the path of democratization and become successful economic powers through rapid economic growth. Specifically, in South Korea, Kim Young-sam was elected as the first genuine civilian president after a long military dictatorship. Next, South Koreans witnessed their first democratic regime change in 1998, in which Kim Dae-jung was elected. His successor, Roh Moo-hyun, was elected in 2003 and served until 2008.

In Taiwan, during the reign of Lee Teng-hui from 1988, he conducted a top-down democratization reform. In 1996, the first direct election by the people was held in Taiwan. In 2000, the first democratic regime change took place in Taiwan when Chen Shui-bian was elected as the first non-Koumintang president. He was re-elected in 2004 and served until 2008. Therefore, this study sets 2008 as the end of a democratically transformed regime.

The two countries also have differences, however. Taiwan's regime (the Koumintang) once had a strong dominance in mainland China, but was driven out by the Communist Party and moved to the island of Taiwan. The Koumintang forcibly controlled the native Taiwanese and maintained martial law until the late 1980s. In South Korea, conflicts with North Korea reached their peak during the Korean War. In the early 1960s, Major General Park Chung-hee set up a military regime by a coup, followed by

Chun Doo-hwan's regime. Martial law did not persist for a long time as in Taiwan, however.

Second, the two countries are prominent examples that have succeeded in the transition from authoritarian to democratic government. After the collapse of the Cold War, many authoritarian countries attempted to convert to democracy. Some states that were authoritarian states, like South Korea and Taiwan, have succeeded in stable democratization. Therefore, if many authoritarian countries experience democratization in the future, this study could provide meaningful lessons for civil–military relations.

Finally, despite these characteristics, it is hard to find precedents of comparative studies of the civil–military relations between the two countries during democratization. In a similar field study, Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn discussed civil–military relations between South Korea and Taiwan—along with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand—in their study “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New Democracies” (2009). In this study, the authors state that South Korea and Taiwan are the only countries that have succeeded in securing civilian control of the military in the region, while Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have failed.¹ The authors explain four causes: “There are historical legacies of authoritarian rule and the path of democratic transition, the internal security role of the military, and the relationship between development and democratic consolidation.”² In addition, they said that the failure of civilian control ultimately results in democratic stagnation in those countries.³ In other words, Croissant and Kuehn set Taiwan and South Korea as one group and compare it with other countries. As a result, there is little comparison of previous research on civil–military relations in the process of democratization between South Korea and Taiwan. Therefore, this study could be a significant precursor in this field.

This paper will first discuss the main theories of civil–military relations in the literature review. After reviewing and summarizing the theories and arguments of

¹ Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New Democracies,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 9 (2009): 187–217.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

distinguished civilian military scholars, this study will select Narcis Serra's military reform theory of the new civil–military relations theory.

Next, this paper will analyze South Korea. The historical and political analysis of the process of democratization in South Korea will be conducted. Then, Narcis Serra's military reform will be used to examine the changes in civil–military relations in the process of democratization. After that, this paper will draw the major implication of analyzing changes in the civil–military relations during the democratization process of South Korea. This paper will then conduct an analysis on Taiwan. Analysis on Taiwan will be conducted in the same order as South Korea. This paper will first look at the process of democratization, then analyze the changes of civil–military relations, and finally draw upon the major implications. After that, this paper will explain the similarities and differences of the two countries. The possible causes of the difference between South Korea and Taiwan will be looked at in the history of the democratization process of the two countries.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter looks at the theories of civil-military relations to research a comparative study on the development of civil-military relations in the process of democratization in South Korea and Taiwan. First, this chapter briefly introduces the overall development of the civil-military relations theories. It introduces the classical theorists of civil-military relations such as Huntington and Janowitz. After that, this chapter will introduce the new civil-military relations theory that emerged recently against the existing civil-military relations theory. The new civil-military relations theory will be used throughout this study.

Next, this chapter selects a theory suitable for analyzing the changing process of civil-military relations, especially during the democratization process. Specifically, this paper uses Narcis Serra's "Military Reform Theory." This theory is applied directly to the subsequent examples of civil-military relations in South Korea and Taiwan, which helps to analyze the similarities and differences between the two countries during the democratization process.

A. OVERVIEW OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY

1. Samuel Huntington's Civil-Military Relations Theory

Civil-military relations refer to "all the relations between military commanders and civilian political leaders in the decision-making process of a country."⁴ The study of civil-military relations in modern times was carried out in earnest, with Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*. He analyzed civilian control to explain the types of civil-military relations. Huntington said that "civilian control is about the relative power of civilians and military groups in order to achieve civilian control, the military power must be reduced."⁵

⁴ Harold Stein, *American Civil-Military Relations: A Book of Case Studies* (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 2003), 23.

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80.

Huntington provides two types of civilian control. One is objective civilian control, and the other is subjective civilian control. Huntington argues that “civilian control in the objective sense is the maximizing of military professionalism, more precisely, it is that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among members of the officer corps.”⁶ According to this objective civilian control, the roles of soldiers and politicians are clearly separated. Politicians set up security and defense policies and directions, and soldiers plan and carry out military operations to support politicians’ decisions.⁷ They respect each other’s territory and do not invade it.⁸ When this control is well maintained, the military generally believes that it is necessary to keep political neutrality by limiting itself to the field of military operations.⁹

This objective civilian control is quite opposed to subjective civilian control. Huntington stated “subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state.”¹⁰ In the context of subjective civilian control, politicians do not respect the distinctive realm of soldiers. Politicians, therefore, want to have direct influence over military operations that are respected as a distinctive area of soldiers in objective civilian control situations.¹¹ In this situation, since politicians can control the promotions of soldiers, soldiers cannot but follow the instructions of politicians rather than assert their opinions to politicians.¹² Also, if the soldiers are subjectively loyal to a particular civilian group that controls them, the political neutrality of the soldiers may be destroyed and conflicts may arise among civilian politicians.¹³

Huntington’s other main theory of civil-military relations is military professionalism. Huntington’s definition of military professionalism is that “professional

⁶ Ibid., 83.

⁷ Kunsahak Yŏn’guhoe, *Introduction to Military Studies* (Seoul: Planet Media, 2014), 535.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Huntington, 83.

¹¹ Kunsahak Yŏn’guhoe, 536.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

soldiers should admit political leadership of civilian leaders while maintaining political neutrality without undermining the principle of civilian control, and that the military is dedicated to external security only.”¹⁴

2. Civil-Military Relations Theory after Huntington

After Huntington, many scholars explained the types of civil-military relations. At first, Eric A. Nordlinger said that the civilian control was divided into the traditional model, liberal model and presentation model.¹⁵ The traditional model is a theory that explains the Middle Ages’ feudal European civil-military system. Civilian control is possible because of the unity of politicians and soldiers, and the homogeneity of worldview.¹⁶ The liberal model is the theory that the military is responsible for keeping the country safe from external threats by moving away from politics itself, and politicians should deal with domestic problems and conflicts.¹⁷ The presentation model explains the control of civilization, which is mainly seen in communist and totalitarian countries, and it is the theory that politicians use ideology and charge of personnel decisions to gain the loyalty of the military.¹⁸ Nordlinger warned, however, that this presentation model could lead to the politicization of the military and make it possible for the military to intervene in domestic politics.¹⁹

Morris Janowitz identified civil-military relations centering on the political development of developing countries and the political involvement of the military, which distinguished the types of civil-military relations into developing country type and developed country type models.²⁰ First of all, the developed country model is divided into

¹⁴ Huntington, 70–72.

¹⁵ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government* (Englewood Cliffs: J. Prentice-Hall, 2003), 10–18.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in The Developing Nations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988) 78–99.

aristocratic feudal model, democratic model, and totalitarian model.²¹ The aristocratic feudal model explains that before industrialism took place in the West, the military elites and civil elites had the background of the same social aristocracy.²² The democratic model makes a difference between the civil and military elites, and the civilian authority controls the army well through official institutions and rules.²³ The totalitarian model is a model in which revolutionary elites from civilians who are from popular authoritarian political parties control military elites.²⁴ In this model, the elites control the army mainly by secret police or political organization.²⁵ The developing country model is divided into authoritarian individual control model, authoritarian popular party control model, democratic competition model, civil-military coalition system model, and military oligarchy system model.²⁶ Developing countries mean those nations that are still undergoing political development.²⁷ The authoritarian individual control model is a common occurrence in developing countries in the early modernization period, when individual dictatorship inhibits the expansion of military forces.²⁸ The authoritarian popular party control model refers to the situation where a single mass party uses civilian police and social systems to deter the military.²⁹ The democratic competition model refers to a state that restricts the functions and powers of the military through formal institutions and regulations.³⁰ The civil-military coalition system model refers to the state in which the military actively supports civilian political parties or private political groups.³¹ In this situation, the military performs widespread political interventions by

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

acting as a formal or informal judge.³² The military oligarchy system model refers to a state in which the military appears as the dominant force and restricts or represses the political activities of civilians.³³

Stanislav Andreski described the praetorianism model. The praetorianism model refers to the country in which the military participates directly in politics, using military rebellions or coups, not in accordance with legally recognized constitutional procedures.³⁴

Next, H. D. Lasswell promoted the “the garrison state model.” This model refers to a state in which a civilian political elite uses the military as a means to rule the country like Imperialist Japan, with fear of war.³⁵

3. The New Civil-Military Relations Theory

Civil–military relations theory has been developed by many scholars since Huntington. The scholars of the new group, however, think that the past civil-military relations theory just concentrates on how the civil-military relations should be. ³⁶ Therefore, they have made the new civil-military relations theory to overcome the limitation.³⁷

Cristiana Matei argued “in order to overcome the challenges of civil-military relations in the current world, it is not enough merely to maintain civilian control over the military, but also to develop effective military, police and intelligence agencies that perform security maintenance functions.”³⁸

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Stanislav Andreski, “On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 3, no. 3 (1980): 4.

³⁵ Harold. D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (Jan 1941), 455–468.

³⁶ Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 29–33.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

In other words, the new paradigm emphasizes effectiveness as well as civilian control of the military. Their specific claims propose institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the inculcation of professional norms as methods of civilian control.³⁹ The scholars who argue the new civil-military relations theory also explain that effectiveness is determined by how well prepared security institutions are in their assigned tasks and roles, but it is very difficult to measure the extent.⁴⁰ Specifically, they present three essential elements for security agencies to carry out their roles efficiently. First, they must have their own future plans such as national security strategies, national military strategies, defense white papers, and disaster plans.⁴¹ Second, there must be a structure and a process for organizing and executing their roles—examples are the ministry of national defense, the ministry of the interior, and the NSC.⁴² Third, the state must have resources such as political capital, money, and manpower to purchase equipment and to train personnel for assigned tasks.⁴³

Incentives that enable civilians to pursue civilian control of the military are also important factors.⁴⁴ Examples include punishing former non-democratic regimes, establishing democratic institutions, and threats outside and inside the country.⁴⁵ In particular, threats are the worst when external threats are low and domestic threats are high; when external threats are high and internal threats are low, it is a good situation for civilian control.⁴⁶

This study will use the new paradigm of civil-military relations research suggested by Matei et al. in analyzing civil-military relations during the process of democratization in South Korea and Taiwan.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Thomas C. Bruneau, "Conclusion," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 346–348.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 11–19.

B. NARCIS SERRA'S MILITARY REFORM THEORY

This chapter explains civil-military relations theory that can be used appropriately to explain the change of civil-military relations in the process of democratization among the new civil-military relations theories.

This study focuses on Serra's military reform theory (Figure 1) in order to analyze the change of civil-military relations in South Korea and Taiwan's democratization process. Originally, Serra's military reform theory was created to analyze the change of democratization of civilian relations in Spain's democratization process.⁴⁷ Serra divided the democratization process into democratic transition and democratic consolidation, and made a visual graph using the three elements of conflict level axis, professionalism axis and control of military axis.⁴⁸ This graph helps to analyze the changes of civil-military relations in an arithmetic and visual way regardless of the nationality of civil-military relations. Therefore, in this study Serra's military reform theory will be of great help in objectively analyzing the similarities and differences between the changes in civil-military relations during the process of democratization in South Korea and Taiwan.

According to Serra, "democratic transition occurs when democratically elected civilians end military intervention in the policy making process, the military may themselves cease to intervene in, or the military privileges may be removed by civilian governments."⁴⁹ He also argues "democratic consolidation occurs when elected civilian governments can establish and implement military and defense policies, and when the government is able to supervise the military whether the policies are properly implemented."⁵⁰ The tool consists of three dimensions: a conflict level axis, a control of military axis, and a professionalism axis.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Narcís Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 27–28.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., 61–65.

Each of these axes helps the country to analyze visually how civil–military relations have been changing during the process of democratization.

The conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis, is able to analyze high tension between civilians and military to low tension between civilians and military.⁵² One of the horizontal axes, the control of military axis, can be analyzed from the military control of politics to civilian control of the military.⁵³ Finally, one of the horizontal axes, the professionalism axis, can be analyzed from army as an institution to army as an occupation.⁵⁴ It is possible to analyze the situation of military reform during the democratization transition and consolidation process.




Figure 3.7. An example of partial military reform

Figure 1. Narcis Serra's military reform theory.⁵⁵

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Source: Serra, 64.

1. The Factors that Affect the Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Transition

To analyze military reform using the tool presented above, one needs to know the factors that affect each axis of analysis. They are factors during democratic transition.

The factors that influence the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis, include legitimizing democracy, existence of internal conflicts, external influences, coherent government actions, and behavior of key political actors.⁵⁶

The factors affecting the control of the military axis, which is the horizontal axis, are legislation on national defense and a reduction of the military presence in the civilian sectors of the administration.⁵⁷

The factors influencing the professionalism axis, the second horizontal axis, include limiting the number of soldiers involved in politics, implementing human rights education in military schools, introducing tolerance for other religions, gradually removing the symbols of the former regime, exchanging with other democratic countries, and reducing the size of the military.⁵⁸

2. Factors that Affect the Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Consolidation

Next are factors that influence military reform during democratic consolidation.

The factors that affect the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis, are increasing the power and legitimacy of the civilian government.⁵⁹

The factors affecting the control of the military axis, which is the horizontal axis, are legal reforms to consolidate democracy, drafting military policy, and eliminating military prerogatives on the civil society.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Ibid., 66–89.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

The factors that influence the professionalism axis, which is the second horizontal axis, are defining new missions and ensuing need for organizational change, measures impacting on the forces as a career, and changing the quality of life in the military.

III. SOUTH KOREA

A. THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Military dictatorships in South Korea since the early 1960s formed a military-superior type of civil-military relations. These civil-military relations, however, began to change with the movement of democratization in South Korea since the late 1970s. This chapter shows that the changes of civil-military relations are related to the movement of democratization. Therefore, this chapter will first look at the process of democratization in South Korea.

1. The Origin of Democracy and Beginning of the Military Regime

The origin of democracy in South Korea can be found in the Donghak Peasant Movement⁶¹ and the establishment of the Independent Association⁶² in the late 19th century.⁶³ The Donghak peasant movement is a movement in which hundreds of thousands of peasants resisted the monarchy in 1886. It insisted on abolition of a class system, equality, and human rights. After this movement, Seo Jae-pil and other intellectuals who studied Western politics established the Independent Association to protect the nation from foreign powers and to reform society in 1896.⁶⁴ In 1897, the Independent Association organized a popular movement called the People's Mass Meeting that promoted major democratic values such as freedom, equality, human rights,

⁶¹ The Donghak Peasant Movement was an anti-feudalism and anti-foreign movement that took place in 1894 during the Chosun dynasty. Donghak is a religion of the Chosun people; the term Donghak [the East religion] means that it is opposed to West's Christianity. It was founded in 1860 by Choi Jae-woo. The core doctrine is "Man is heaven, and all men should not be despised and discriminated, and the heart of heaven is the heart of man." The Donghak Peasant Movement, in which hundreds of thousands of people participated, succeeded in overthrowing the Chosun government military, but the Chosun government brought the Qing and the Japanese forces over them. Finally, the movement was defeated.

⁶² In 1886, it was a civil society organization based on the cultivated intellectuals such as Seo Jae-pil. Internally, it claimed human rights and suffrage of the people. In particular, it has opened up the People's Mass Meeting to push for the declaration of democratic values such as freedom, equality, human rights, national sovereignty, and separation of power. In 1889, however, the Gojong of the Chosun Dynasty, who felt threatened by the movement, dissolved the Independent Association.

⁶³ Hyung-ik Choi, "The Origin of Modern Democracy in Korea," *Korean Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (Sep 2004): 183–209.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

national sovereignty, and separation of powers.⁶⁵ A representative example was to form a democratic parliament.⁶⁶ In addition, the Independent Association operated its own newspaper, the Independence Newspaper, that formed a forum for public opinion through free speech.⁶⁷ Although the efforts of the Independent Association failed due to the repression of the Chosun dynasty, when the Korean Provisional Government was established in 1919 in Shanghai, it took the Democratic Republic as a provisional constitution by the influence of the Independent Association.⁶⁸ Since then, after liberation from Japanese imperialism in 1945, South Korea directly imported American democracy through the US military.⁶⁹ At this time, South Korea coordinated the democratic values that they already had with American democracy.⁷⁰ Finally, when the Korean government was established in 1947, democracy was adopted as a constitution.⁷¹ The April 19th Revolution⁷² in 1960 is a representative example of the South Korean democracy. At that time, the Lee Seung-man (period of presidency: 1948–1960) regime staged illegal elections in order to build a dictatorship system. Hundreds of thousands of citizens resisted and broke the regime, however.

After the revolution, there was a Chang Myun (period of presidency: 1960–1961) regime in South Korea through a democratic election. The democratic regime did not last long, however. In 1961, Major General Park Chung-hee (period of presidency: 1962–1979), took control of the country by staging a coup. After this, though there had been a long military regime in South Korea, South Korean society did not give up and continued a democratic movement. South Korea's democracy, which was rooted in the late Chosun dynasty, continued its line in the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea and

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² The April 19th Revolution was a protest by hundreds of thousands of citizens who opposed the government in April 1960 when the government tried to elect Lee Ki-boong as a vice president by illegal means. In the face of this national resistance, President Lee Seung-man finally resigned on April 26.

formed a structure in the US military government with American democracy.⁷³ Although the democracy was in crisis after the military regime became prolonged, economic development through industrialization of capitalism in the 1970s led to the expansion of the middle class within the society, forming civil society.⁷⁴ In addition, the spread of complaints within the society brought by authoritarian violence stimulated the democratic movement of student forces that had been in power since the April 19th revolution.⁷⁵ Due to these factors, the democratization movement in South Korea once again occurred in earnest in the late 1970s.

In particular, the Bu-Ma democratic movement⁷⁶ occurred in 1979. Since the opposition Democratic Party won in the general election held in December 1978, there had been a national democratic movement. The Republican Party, which was the ruling party, removed Kim Young-sam, who was then the president of the Democratic Party, from the congress in October 1979. On October 16, 1979, a massive democratization movement started in the Busan and the Masan regions, led by university students. From October 18, the Park Chung-hee regime declared martial law in the area and mobilized military troops to suppress the demonstrations. Nevertheless, protests continued until October 26, when Park Chung-hee died.

2. Chun Doo-hwan Regime and the Movement of Full-Scale Democratization

Park Chung-hee, the South Korean dictator, was assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, who was the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, on October 26, 1979. After that, people hoped that the Korean society would be democratized, but Major General Chun Doo-hwan launched a coup to install the military regime again. In particular, the

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Chang-jip Choi, *Minjuhwa ihu ui Minjujuui* [Democracy after democratization] (Seoul: Humanitasu, 2010), 82–106.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ The Bu-ma Democratic Uprising was a democratization movement in October 1979 to protest the dictatorship of the Park Chung-hee regime in the Busan and Masan regions. Tens of thousands of civilians participated in the demonstration, where students of Pusan National University started saying “remove the Yushin.” The Park Chung-hee regime declared martial law in this area and mobilized troops to suppress the movements. Immediately after this incident, Kim Jae-kyu, who was the head of the Central Intelligence Agency on October 26, assassinated President Park Chung-hee.

Chun Doo-hwan regime (period of presidency: 1980–1988) took control of all political and economic institutions using the military.⁷⁷ The military took major civilian positions throughout the country, which was more severe than in the past.⁷⁸ At the time of the military regime, the military had an overwhelming advantage over civilians. First of all, the main members of the administration, including the president, were reserve soldiers. In addition, the soldiers made direct political parties and participated in legislative activities. The military intelligence agency also had the authority to inspect the civilian population, so that the military's ability to monitor and intervene in the society was strong. Schools and universities conducted military exercises, and the military conducted political education. In particular, a unique case in South Korea was “the Yushin Secretary System,” which hired reservists who were usually captains (O-3) as senior government officials. This system not only allowed the retired generals to take over the leadership of the administration, but also young officer reservists were able to take over the middle organization of the administration.

Thus, during the Chun Doo-hwan regime, the conflict between the democratic movement power and the state power became more severe.⁷⁹ The May 18th incident is a representative example. Hundreds of thousands of Gwangju citizens protested against the regime of Chun Doo-hwan and the abolition of martial law. Against this backdrop, the Chun Doo-hwan regime put airborne troops in Gwangju and suppressed the protesters by force. In the process, 633 people were killed.⁸⁰ This incident resulted in a critical wound in civil-military relations. Despite this incident, however, citizens continued to struggle for democracy. The crucial event that led to the democratization of South Korea in particular was the democratization uprising in June 1987. Citizens at that time demanded a general election, which citizens hoped to elect the president directly to end the dictatorship. President Chun Doo-hwan made “the April 13th Constitutional

⁷⁷ Younggap Cho, *Min'gun Kwan'gye wa Kukka Anbo* [Civil Military Relations and National Security] (Seoul: Bookorea, 2005), 284.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 285.

⁸⁰ Minjuhwa Undong Kinyŏm Saŏphoe [the Democratization Movement Memorial Business Association], *The Development of Korean Democracy 3* (Seoul: Dolbegae, 2010), 137.

Arrangement,” however, under which his successors would be elected indirectly by electoral colleges. Then, while people made major democratic protests, there were Park Jong-cheol’s death by torture and Lee Han-yul’s death by tear gas attack.⁸¹ The two events exploded the anger of the citizens. Citizens across the country came to the streets and protested against dictatorship. Millions of people participated in the protest, which lasted for about three weeks. Finally, the Chun Doo-hwan regime announced a constitutional amendment on June 29, 1987, and promised “presidential direct election.” This ended the demonstration.

In the presidential election held at the end of the year, however, Roh Tae-woo (period of presidency: 1988–1993), who was a military junior member of President Chun Doo-hwan, was elected president. The reason was that democratic activists Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam failed to unify and run independently.

Nevertheless, in the Roh Tae-woo regime, civil-military relations showed change because he had to consider that more than half of the people voted for democracy activists in the presidential election.⁸² First of all, the ministry of national defense issued a commander letter to the whole military on January 1, 1990, emphasizing “the political neutrality of the military and adhering to its mission.”⁸³ Furthermore, Lee Jong-koo, the minister of defense in 1991, said, “the political intervention of the military is an anachronistic idea, and I do not think that officers will intervene in politics. It would be

⁸¹ On January 3, 1987, the police arrested Park Jong-chul, who was a student of Seoul National University, to investigate the democratic movement. Police said on January 14 that Park Jong-cheol died after he drank cold water and was surprised by the sound of hitting the desk. The media reported the possibility of death by torture based on statement of autopsy, however. Though the prosecution began investigating the case, the police officially announced that the only two policemen mistakenly murdered Park Jong-cheol by a water torture. The police cremated the body, thus destroying the evidence. On August 15, 1987, however, “Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice” exposed the organizational reduction of the police’s Park Jong-cheol case, and systematic torture by major police officers. After the death of Park Jong-cheol, the democratic movement against the Chun Doo-hwan regime accelerated. In the meantime, on June 9, 1987, a student of Yonsei University, Lee Han-yeol, was killed by police tear gas attack during the protest. The scene that he was slaughtered was reported to domestic and foreign media. The two events further fueled national resistance to the Chun Doo-hwan regime and became the fuse of the June democratic movement.

⁸² In the 13th presidential election in South Korea, President Roh Tae-woo, who succeeded Chun Doo-hwan, won 36.3 percent. Kim Young-sam, who is a democratization activist, won 28 percent and Kim Dae-jung who is also a democratization activist, received 27 percent.

⁸³ Cho, 287.

disastrous to intervene in politics.”⁸⁴ At that time, the military did not actively try to intervene in politics. According to Aurel Croissant, soldiers did not think that they would be threatened by the government because Roh Tae-woo was from the military and supported by the Chun Doo-hwan regime.⁸⁵ For example, investigations of the military about illegal events in the past had been delayed through political agreements between the president and the opposition political parties.⁸⁶ Also, military intelligence agencies continued to monitor civilians as before.⁸⁷ Therefore, the soldiers did not fear Roh Tae-woo’s regime or feel the need to intervene politically.⁸⁸ President Roh Tae-woo tried to protect the interests, values and political status of the military.⁸⁹

Even if military professionalism at that time was stable, there were cases in which the political neutrality of the military could be suspected. One example was the illegal election activity of the military in the March 24th general election in 1992.⁹⁰ The commanders of the military advocated or criticized specific political parties and candidates.⁹¹ At that time, the change of military professionalism did not bring civilian control. Specifically, the defense minister had been a retired general, and institutional efforts for civil control did not take place. The military thus maintained their authority under the protection of the regime.

3. The Kim Young-sam Regime and the Beginning of the Civilian Regime

In 1993, President Kim Young-sam (period of presidency: 1993–1998) was elected as the first genuine civilian president after the long-term dictatorship of the

⁸⁴ Ibid., 288.

⁸⁵ Aurel Croissant, “Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea,” *Armed Forces and Society* 30, no. 3 (Spring 2004): 370–371.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ David Kuehn, “Institutionalising Civilian Control of the Military in New Democracies: Theory and Evidence from South Korea,” *Giga working paper*, no. 282 (February, 2016): 1–34.

⁸⁸ Croissant, 370–371.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Tu-seng Hong, *Han’guk ūi Kun Kwa Simin Sahoe* [Korean Military and Civilian Society] (Koyang-si: In’gan Sarang, 2015), 36–39.

⁹¹ Ibid.

military. From that time, a civilian democratic government was reborn in South Korea. He joined forces with past military regimes to be elected president, however. Kim Young-sam was a member of the Democratic Liberal Party composed of the Democratic Justice Party, the Unification Democratic Party, and the New Democratic Republican Party. Nevertheless, after the election of President Kim Young-sam, the political environment was favorable for reforming the military.⁹² First of all, he won the presidential election in 1992, through the direct election of the people. Furthermore, he was a member of the conservative Democratic Liberal Party, so he was not suspected of being a pro-North Korean.⁹³ These conditions made the military easily accept him. Furthermore, he was originally a democratic activist, so he also had legitimacy as a democratic politician.⁹⁴ In this friendly environment, President Kim Young-sam conducted reforms to correct civil-military relations.⁹⁵

His most important achievement was removing the “Hanahoe [One group].” This group only selected officers from the Army Academy, and its members were born in Taegu and Gyeongsang provinces.⁹⁶ They were powerful forces in the army with the sponsorship of President Park Chung-hee and President Chun Doo-hwan.⁹⁷ President Kim Young-sam excluded members of Hanahoe, including the chief of the army, the commander of the security intelligence, and the commander of special forces who had real power in the army.⁹⁸ Next, the Kim Young-sam regime investigated the corruption of the military that had not been revealed in the past.⁹⁹ President Kim Young-sam’s actions against the military did not end with this. He even arrested former President Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo and thirteen former generals who had staged a coup as soldiers in the past, and conducted an investigation of the Gwangju Democratization Movement

⁹² Croissant, 371.

⁹³ Ibid 372.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Cho, 292.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

when the military killed civilians.¹⁰⁰ He also abolished the military intelligence agency's civilian surveillance and created a procedure in which Congress could systematically control the military.¹⁰¹

In this process, the military did not resist the regime. A possible reason is fear of the citizens. Soldiers experienced direct armed conflict with citizens, undergoing the May 18th democratic movement of armed conflicts in the previous regime. In addition, the military witnessed the democratic uprising when tens of millions of citizens came out on the streets to resist military dictatorships in June 1987.¹⁰² The military had to worry that their political intervention would lead to a democratic struggle of citizens. Therefore, there was no willingness for the military to suffer the many casualties that could arise when the military suppressed the struggle of such citizens. This opinion of the military was also revealed in the interview by Lee Jong-koo, the former Minister of National Defense. Lee Jong-koo warned that military intervention would bring about disaster.¹⁰³ Furthermore, the democratization movement continued during the Roh Tae-woo regime. This made it difficult for the military to conduct political engagement. The Roh Tae-woo regime responded strongly to the democratization movements in various parts of society.¹⁰⁴ On April 26, 1991, when Kang Kyung-dae, a student of Myongji University, was murdered by the plainclothes police during the demonstration, nationwide demonstrations for democracy again took place.¹⁰⁵ While several million citizens participated in demonstrations nationwide for sixty days,¹⁰⁶ eleven people committed

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Victor D. Cha, "Security and Democracy in South Korean Development," in *Korea's Democratization*, edited by Samuel S. Kim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 208.

¹⁰² In June 1987, millions of civilians participated in the June democratic movement, almost every day, against the dictatorship of the Chun Doo-hwan regime.

¹⁰³ Cho, 288.

¹⁰⁴ Minjuhwa Undong Kinyŏm Saŏphoe, 463–473.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ There is no official data on the number of citizens who participated in the 60-day democratization movement. According to Minjuhwa Undong Kinyŏm Saŏphoe [the Democratization Movement Memorial Business Association], however, more than 300,000 people participated nationwide on the day of May 9th.

suicide, and another student died during the demonstration.¹⁰⁷ These nationwide democratization movements played a role of checking the power of the military.

Such efforts by President Kim Young-sam certainly contributed to military professionalism. Civilian control of the military was only partially improved, however. First, no civilian defense minister was appointed. Only a few civilians served as deputy defense ministers.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, most of the employees in the ministry of national defense were active military officers.¹⁰⁹ The military control in the congress changed considerably, however.¹¹⁰ The national defense commission in the congress began to properly check and balance against the ministry of defense.¹¹¹

Cho Young-gap assessed Kim Young-sam's military reform as follows: "First, it contributed to increasing military professionalism; second, the dismantling of private groups in the military and the reform of the personnel; third, the restructuring of the security command, which was the most political institution in the military; finally, he contributed to make democratic and effective military operations."¹¹² According to a survey¹¹³ on the national consciousness conducted in Korea, the military had the largest influence on politics in 1988, but in 1990 it ranked fourth, and in 1993 it fell to sixth.¹¹⁴ Also, the number of members of congress from military services decreased significantly. In 1992, the national congress members from the military service were thirty-five percent, but they were reduced to fifteen percent in 1996.¹¹⁵ Also, the proportion of former military officers among the higher governmental officers (ministers) had declined

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ki-joo Kim, "The Soldier and the State in South Korea," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 21, no. 2 (2014): 125.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 127.

¹¹² Cho, 298–301.

¹¹³ Seoul National University, *Hankook Sahoe wa Kookmin eusik Josa Yungu* [Korean Society and National Consciousness Survey and Research], 1993.

¹¹⁴ Cho, 295.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 297.

from nineteen percent to eight percent.¹¹⁶ People had active support for Kim Young-sam's military reform. At that time, ninety percent of the people supported the reform, and only three percent of the people worried about the side effects of the reform.¹¹⁷

4. Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun Regime and the First Regime Change

After President Kim Young-sam, President Kim Dae-jung (period of presidency: 1998–2003) took power. President Kim Dae-jung's leadership was a major test of civil-military relations.¹¹⁸ Although President Kim Young-sam was a civilian, he inherited the political party from the past military regime. The political party to which Kim Dae-jung belonged had never been in power in the past, however, and had struggled historically with the military regime. Indeed, President Kim Dae-jung was kidnapped and almost assassinated by the military government.¹¹⁹ Therefore, President Kim Dae-jung's election and power could be a major stimulus for the military forces. Moreover, President Kim Dae-jung had a sunshine policy for North Korea. The sunshine policy emphasized dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas. This was a policy that was resented by the military, which mainly had a view of opposing North Korea. Nevertheless, the military accepted the policy of President Kim Dae-jung.¹²⁰ The military officially did not protest against the regime or intervene in domestic politics.¹²¹ This kind of civil-military relationship showed that the professionalism of the military in South Korea has been

¹¹⁶ Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Philip Lorenz, and Paul W. Chambers, *Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 61.

¹¹⁷ Croissant, "Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea," 374.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 376.

¹¹⁹ In August 1973, the Central Intelligence Agency of the Park Chung-hee administration attempted to assassinate Kim Dae-jung. Kim Dae-jung, who had political asylum in Washington, DC, USA, visited Tokyo in order to organize a group branch for the democratization movement for South Korea. On August 8, 1973, when Kim Dae-jung was staying at a hotel in Tokyo, he was attacked by members of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and was forced into a ship in Osaka. At that time, Kim Dae-jung was in danger of being drowned at sea with a weight. But, since the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force discovered the ship, the kidnappers abandoned the assassination. After a few days, Kim Dae-jung was found near his home in Seoul. (This anecdote was revealed in Kim Dae-jung's autobiography [Kim Dae-jung, *Autobiography of Kim Dae-jung* (Seoul: Samin, 2011).], the records of investigation by the Japanese government, and the testimonies of former Central Intelligence Agency staffs. Even, this incident was released in 2002 as a film named "*KT*" in cooperation with South Korea and Japan.)

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

stabilized. In addition, he appointed a number of civilian experts to the ministry of defense and created the National Security Council to control defense policy.¹²²

Following Kim Dae-jung, President Roh Moo-hyun (period of presidency: 2003–2008), who came from the same political party, continued engagement with North Korea, but a stable civil-military relationship was relatively well maintained. He further expanded the powers of the NSC and tried to monitor the military's weapons adoption program by creating the Defense Acquisition Program Administration.¹²³ He also created a congressional hearing of the joint chiefs of staff to strengthen the military control by the national assembly.¹²⁴

It is not that there was no noise in civil-military relations, however. In 2002, when the Kim Dae-jung regime pursued the sunshine policy,¹²⁵ North Korean naval vessels invaded to the south in the Western Sea, resulting in “the Second Yeonpyeong Sea Battle.” At that time, six South Korean navy personnel were killed and eighteen injured. After the battle, the president, the prime minister, and the minister of national defense did not attend the funeral ceremony of the dead on the grounds of the ceremony rules.¹²⁶ There was considerable dissatisfaction within the military.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, the military did not officially oppose the regime. There was a similar case in the Roh Moo-hyun government. Lee Jong-seok, who was chief of the NSC in 2004, instructed the military not to say “Main Enemy” when talking about North Korea.¹²⁸ This was a political decision that took into account the atmosphere of reconciliation that had

¹²² Kuehn, 16.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ It is the Kim Dae-jung regime's reconciliation and cooperation policy toward North Korea. The aim was to create the environment and conditions for North Korea to change itself through more contact, dialogue and cooperation. One of the ways is building an economic community from the perspective of common prosperity of the whole nation. [Source: “North Korea Information Portal,” Ministry of Unification in R.O.K, Sep 30, 2017, [http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewKnwldgDicary.do?pageIndex=1&dicaryId=233&koreanChrctr=&searchCnd=0&searchWrd=.](http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewKnwldgDicary.do?pageIndex=1&dicaryId=233&koreanChrctr=&searchCnd=0&searchWrd=.”)]

¹²⁶ Hong, 143.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. “Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of Korea: Background and Implications,” *Korea Observer* 36, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 615–616.

progressed between the two Koreas, but there was considerable internal dissatisfaction from the military.¹²⁹ According to a survey conducted by the ministry of defense at the time, eighty-four percent of the soldiers said they should use the term “Main Enemy” for North Korea.¹³⁰ One officer said in an interview, “It has become difficult to give our soldiers psychological training, and it will get tougher in the future.”¹³¹ Nevertheless, however, the military did not stage an official rebellion against the regime. Therefore, after Kim Young-sang and Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s regime, it can be said that the professionalism of the South Korea military stabilized considerably.

At this stage, possible reasons why the military accepted the changes in civil-military relations would be not only the fear of the resistance of the citizens but also the maturation of the perception of the military’s own democratization. South Korea’s military service system is a conscription system, and all adult males who are physically able are required to do military service. Therefore, the majority of the members of the military are ordinary citizens, not professional soldiers. This means that, even if the military commanders plan an engagement in politics as they had in the past, they should doubt whether the members would join in any attempt. The maturation of democracy within these forces naturally led to the improvement of military professionalism.

Civilian control was possible because the civilian president acts as the top leader of the military. After the regime of Kim Young-sam, however, there has not been a genuine civilian minister of national defense, the official who makes actual military policy. All of them were retired generals. To its credit, the regime tried to raise the ratio of civilian employees in the ministry of national defense to increase the proportion of civilians from fifty percent to seventy percent in the long term.¹³² Nonetheless, the main positions that determine policies were occupied by active soldiers and prior-military civilians.¹³³ Kim Ki-joo said that, “[T]he ongoing high national security threat will help

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Kim, 126.

¹³³ Ibid.

the armed forces to justify and retain its institutional autonomy in the process of democratic consolidation.”¹³⁴

B. CHANGES IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION

Using Narcis Serra’s theoretical analysis framework and the historical background introduced in the preceding chapter, this chapter examines the changing civil-military relations of South Korea during democratization.

Serra argues that “The democratic transition occurs when democratically elected civilians end military intervention in the policy making process, because the military may themselves cease to intervene in, or the military privileges may be removed by civilian governments.”¹³⁵ “Democratic consolidation occurs when elected civilian governments can establish and implement military and defense policies, and when the government is able to supervise the military whether the policies are properly implemented.”¹³⁶

According to this, the democratic transition in South Korea can be categorized as occurring during the Kim Young-sam regime. This is because the Kim Young-sam regime abolished the military intelligence monitoring function to civilian sectors¹³⁷ and eliminated the internal private group of the army that had a significant impact on defense policy.¹³⁸ In addition, President Kim Young-sam had significantly reduced the rate of advancement of government officials from the military during the regime.¹³⁹ These factors helped to prevent the military from interfering with the government’s decision-making process.

The democratic consolidation can be categorized as taking place during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regimes. This is because the Kim Dae-jung regime

¹³⁴ Ibid., 129.

¹³⁵ Serra, 27–28.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Cha, 208.

¹³⁸ Cho, 292.

¹³⁹ Croissant, Kuehn, Lorenz, and Chambers, 61.

appointed a number of civilian experts in the ministry of national defense, and the NSC had been created directly under the President to create and control defense policies by the civilian government.¹⁴⁰ President Kim Dae-jung's successor, President Roh Moo-hyun, expanded the NSC's capabilities¹⁴¹ and increased the civilian staff in the ministry of national defense.¹⁴² He also created the defense acquisition program administration for government surveillance of the military's arms purchase business.¹⁴³ Therefore, the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regimes can be categorized as the administrations of the democratic consolidation period. First, let us look at the process of the democratic transition.

1. Democratic Transition Period—Kim Young-sam Regime

First, the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis of Serra's model, can be considered stable. After the long military dictatorship, President Kim Young-sam was elected as the first genuine civilian president through popular direct election. It can be judged that the legitimacy of democracy greatly increased as he took power in a legal process. Furthermore, President Kim Young-sam succeeded in eliminating Hanahoe, a powerful military faction.¹⁴⁴ He also arrested former presidents and generals who had caused a coup and massacred civilians in the past.¹⁴⁵ Even in this situation, however, the military did not protest or resist the government, and accepted the reform measures.¹⁴⁶ In this regard, the conflict level axis did not increase significantly, and remained stable.

Next, look at the control of the military axis. At first, Kim Young-sam abolished the military intelligence agency's civilian surveillance.¹⁴⁷ In contrast, the military surveillance function of the national assembly was improved during the Kim Young-sam

¹⁴⁰ Kuehn, 16.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Kim, 126.

¹⁴³ Kuehn, 16.

¹⁴⁴ Cho, 292.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Cha, 208.

government.¹⁴⁸ The national defense commission, in particular, has been functioning in the national assembly, allowing for checks and surveillance of the military.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, the proportion of former military officers among the higher governmental officers (ministers) had declined from nineteen percent to eight percent.¹⁵⁰ These factors indicate that the control of the military axis moved significantly towards civil control of the military.

Finally, on another horizontal axis, the professionalism axis, the number of military members of the national assembly dropped from thirty-five percent to fifteen percent during the regime.¹⁵¹ Also, the government abolished the military intelligence agency's civilian surveillance and made them just focus on their original military security job.¹⁵² Furthermore, according to the survey¹⁵³ on national consciousness conducted in South Korea, the military had the largest influence on politics in 1988, but in 1990 it ranked fourth, and in 1993, it fell to sixth.¹⁵⁴ These figures indicate that the professionalism axis has moved significantly towards the military as an occupation.

2. Democratic Consolidation Period—Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun Regimes

Next, let us look at the period of democratic consolidation. This period can be seen as the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. First, let us deal with the conflict level axis, which is a vertical axis. The inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung was a major watershed for civil-military relations.¹⁵⁵ During the term of President Kim Dae-jung and his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, however, there was no official military protest or rebellion. The military embraced and implemented the policies of civilian

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Kim, 127.

¹⁵⁰ Croissant, Kuehn, Lorenz, and Chambers, 61.

¹⁵¹ Cho, 297.

¹⁵² Cha, 208.

¹⁵³ Seoul National University, *Hankook Sahoe wa Kookmin eusik Josa Yungu* [Korean Society and National Consciousness Survey and Research], 1993. Sep.

¹⁵⁴ Cho, 295.

¹⁵⁵ Croissant, 376.

leaders such as the Sunshine Policy (an engagement policy with North Korea).¹⁵⁶ This indicates that the vertical axis had stabilized considerably and had shifted towards a low tension between civilians and the military.

At the control axis of the military, Kim Dae-jung appointed a number of civilian experts to the ministry of defense and created the NSC to control defense policies.¹⁵⁷ Following Kim Dae-jung, President Roh Moo-hyun, who came from the same political party, further expanded the powers of the NSC and tried to monitor the military's weapons adoption program by creating the defense acquisition program administration.¹⁵⁸ He also created a congressional hearing system of the joint chiefs of staff.¹⁵⁹ In addition, Roh Moo-hyun's regime tried to raise the ratio of civilian employees in the ministry of national defense to increase the proportion of civilians from fifty percent to seventy percent in the long term.¹⁶⁰ As a result, the control axis of the military moved significantly towards the civilian control of the military.

The last remaining horizontal axis is the professionalism axis. The ratio of reserve military officers to the cabinet was reduced during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun regimes, especially during the Roh regime as it was mainly limited to the minister of defense.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, efforts were made to raise the salary of the military personnel and build welfare facilities for soldiers and their families.¹⁶² Also, a defense reform was promoted to reduce the size of and reorganize the military, reorienting it from a conventional war to an effect-oriented focus.¹⁶³ These factors have allowed the professionalism axis to move significantly toward the army as an occupation. Figure 2 details the changes in civil-military relations during democratization in South Korea.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Kuehn, 16.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Kim, 126.

¹⁶¹ Byung-gi Jeong, "Cham-yeojeongbu ihu Jeongchijeog Pawo-elliteuui Gyocheewa Jeonmang [Political Power Elite Replacement and Prospects after the Roh Government]," *Munhaggwa Gyeong-gye* 5, no. 2 (2005): 73–78.

¹⁶² R.O.K. Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper* (Seoul, 2005)

¹⁶³ R.O.K. Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper* (Seoul, 2016).




Figure 2. Changes in civil-military relations during democratization in South Korea.¹⁶⁴

C. MAJOR IMPLICATIONS

As a result, the civil–military relations of South Korea gradually changed. When Roh Tae-woo was elected directly after the long military dictatorship, he did not directly implement reforms because he was from the military. There were limited changes, however. The democratic transition of civil-military relations in South Korea seems likely with the election of President Kim Young-sam. He contributed to the civilian control of the military and to the improvement of professionalism by accomplishing the elimination of Hanahoe and the defeat of the past coup forces. Furthermore, President Kim Dae-jung and President Roh Moo-hyun, who succeeded Kim Dae-jung, strengthened the civilian control of the military by creating the NSC and expanding the ratio of civilian staff in the ministry of defense.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Adapted from Serra, 64.

¹⁶⁵ Kuehn, 16 and Kim, 126.

The application of Serra's theory of military reform shows that the conflict level axis remains fairly stable during the democratic transition and consolidation process, and the control of the military axis also moves gradually toward the strengthening of the civilian control of the military. The professionalism axis moves toward the army as an occupation over time.

This is related to the democratization movement in South Korean society. In South Korea, tens of millions of citizens fought for democratization, beginning with the 19th April Movement in 1960 and Bu-Ma Democratic Protests in 1979, the May 18th Incident in Gwangju in 1980, and the democratization uprising in June 1987. In the process, hundreds of civilians were imprisoned, tortured and killed by the authoritarian regimes. South Korea became aware of the importance of democratization, however. Eventually, this helped the military accept civilian control.

This movement is also accompanied by military effectiveness and incentives for civilians that the new civil-military relations theory emphasizes. Specifically, President Roh Moo-hyun created a plan for a defense reform to create a new military paradigm for the effectiveness of the military. It tried to make an effective plan against North Korea and for dealing with potential external threats in the Northeast Asia region. Also, in terms of incentives, President Kim Young-sam was the first genuine civilian president since the long military dictatorship. In addition, he was a combative democratic activist during the military regimes. Therefore, he determined to fix the civilian control of the military, which was not properly established during the military dictatorship, and to punish the faults of past regimes. Also, once North Korea began serious nuclear development in the 1990s, the external threat increased while the internal threat remained stable. Therefore, the time was right for him to change civil-military relations with an incentive.

There are also other sides, however. First, there has not been a genuine civilian minister of national defense in South Korea. Moreover, most of them were from the army. Members of the navy and air force were rarely appointed. In addition, the degree of civilianization of the ministry of national defense is not high, though Kim Dae-jung's and Roh Moo-hyun's regimes tried to raise the ratio of civilian employees in the ministry of

national defense from fifty percent to seventy percent over the long term.¹⁶⁶ This is because the main positions that determine policies were occupied by active soldiers and civilians who had been soldiers.¹⁶⁷ “The ongoing high national security threat would help the armed forces to justify and retain its institutional autonomy in the process of democratic consolidation.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Kim, 126.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid 129.

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IV. TAIWAN

A. THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

This chapter looks at the changes in Taiwan's civil-military relations. Similar in method to the analysis of South Korea, this chapter also reveals that the democratization movement in Taiwan correlates with changes in civil-military relations. In Taiwan, martial law had continued from Chiang Kai-shek's 1949 arrival in Taiwan to 1987. In the process of democratization in Taiwan, citizens' voluntary resistance to anti-authoritarian as well as other factors such as international pressure and political leaders' preference played an important role.

1. Chiang Kai-shek and the Beginning of the Long Koumintang Regime

In 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek (period of presidency: 1947–1975) arrived in Taiwan after losing the civil war on the Chinese mainland, he declared martial law for the whole country of Taiwan and created the powerful dictatorship of the Koumintang. Even in 1947, before the full-fledged entry of Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan, the Feb 28th Incident¹⁶⁹ took place. The Kuomintang army slaughtered Taiwanese who opposed the oppressive rule of the Koumintang by force. In Taiwan, a coercive regime maintained power until the end of martial law in June 1987. Until that time, the military was a great supporter of the dictatorship of the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

Chiang Kai-shek believed that if troops were mentally armed with political education, they would someday be able to reestablish control over the mainland.¹⁷⁰ The officers of the Taiwanese military had to become members of the Koumintang.¹⁷¹ The Taiwanese military was not the national army, but the party's army. During this period,

¹⁶⁹ This is a struggle caused by the Taiwanese inhabitants against the tyranny of the Chinese Koumintang government officials. At that time, the Kuomintang government slaughtered about thirty thousand Taiwanese by sending the military forces from the Chinese mainland. [Republic of China Executive Yuan, *Feb 28th Incident Research Report*, 1991.]

¹⁷⁰ Bernard D. Cole, *Taiwan's Security* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 136.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 137.

there was no genuine civilian military control in Taiwan.¹⁷² Although the Koumintang sent political commissars to the military, the military actively participated in the social and political spheres of Taiwan.¹⁷³ First, the soldiers directly participated in the civilian government.¹⁷⁴ For example, a deputy of Chiang Kai-shek, General Chen Cheng, led the administration of Taiwan as a vice president and Prime Minister from 1949 to 1963.¹⁷⁵ Active officers and reserve generals accounted for thirty percent of the members of the central standing committee, the most important committee of the Koumintang.¹⁷⁶ In addition, the chief of the general staff had the right to report directly to the President without going through the prime minister.¹⁷⁷ Also, the military was able to determine its own defense policy within the Koumintang.¹⁷⁸ In the social area, the military established military training institutions in schools and universities to give political lectures.¹⁷⁹ The military also established newspapers, radio stations and film studios to direct the Koumintang's instructions to the public.¹⁸⁰ In conclusion, the military acted as a guardian of the Koumintang and exerted a powerful influence on the domestic politics, economy and society.¹⁸¹ The implementation of martial law had widened the range of activities of the military and served as a limit to civilian control.

¹⁷² M. Taylor Fravel, "Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan's Democratization," *Armed Forces and Society* 29, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 59.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 62.

¹⁷⁸ David Kuehn, "Democratization and Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan," *Democratization* 15, no. 5 (December 2008), 874.

¹⁷⁹ Fravel, 63.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Fravel, 59.

2. Chiang Ching-kuo and the Beginning of Change for Democracy

The Kaohsiung Incident¹⁸² is a meaningful movement that took place during Taiwan's democratization process. It was a demonstration that occurred on December 10, 1979. The protest was organized by the magazine *Meilidao* in Kaohsiung City, Taiwan. Hundreds of people took part in the demonstration; more than one hundred people were arrested by the police and dozens were convicted. This incident had a significant influence on Taiwan's democratization movement. The influence of this incident led to the creation of the Democratic Progressive Party, the first opposition party in Taiwan, and Chen Shui-bian, a then lawyer in this case, to be elected as president later. This incident caused the United States to have an interest in Taiwan's human rights and democracy, causing the U.S. government to put pressure on the Taiwanese government.¹⁸³

In 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo (period of presidency: 1978–1988), the son of Taiwanese leader Chiang Kai-shek, decided to accept democracy in 1986. His decision seemed to be made alone, rather than by discussion with ruling leaders.¹⁸⁴ In fact, the Koumintang's main officials were not aware of that until he made the decision.¹⁸⁵ In an interview with *the Washington Post* in October 1986, he said he planned to abolish martial law.¹⁸⁶ There is no exact record of why he made the decision to accept democracy.¹⁸⁷ Scholars supposed some possible reasons why he decided to accept democracy himself, however. In the first place, there was a rising of social desire for

¹⁸² The Kaohsiung Incident was a democratization movement in Kaohsiung, Taiwan on December 10, 1979. Formosa Magazine, headed by Huang Shin-Chieh, a former congress member, planned the democratization movement at the UN Human Rights Day. Hundreds of people participated in the protest and demanded the democratization of Taiwan. In the process, more than 100 people were arrested by the police and a dozen were handed over for trial. It is a monumental event in Taiwan's democratization movement.

¹⁸³ Yi-suo Tzeng, "Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Taiwan 1986–2007," (PhD diss., George Washington University, 2009), 88.

¹⁸⁴ Hung-mao Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan," in *Taiwan in a Time of Transition*, ed. Harvey Feldman and Michael Y. M. Kau (New York: Paragon House, 1988), 9–11.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Tzeng, 92.

¹⁸⁷ Tien, 9–11.

democracy after the Kaohsiung Incident in society.¹⁸⁸ In fact, in Taiwan, the strict authoritarianism of the Koumintang made it hard for the democratization movement to spread. The Koumintang limited democratic rights guaranteed by the Constitution after the 1949 declaration of martial law. In particular, they banned any form of rallies and demonstrations and oppressed the democratic movement.¹⁸⁹ The Koumintang killed about 3,000 political prisoners during the martial law period.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, it was not easy for the democratic activists in Taiwan to carry out a broad democratic movement as in South Korea.¹⁹¹ Fulda argued that considering the political environment in Taiwan, promoting democracy moderately and peacefully was the best possible choice for democratic activists.¹⁹² He further argued that while the moderate political activists such as Lin Xiantang and Kang Ningxiang during the dictatorship of the Koumintang had been ignored by academics in the past, their campaigns clearly meant democracy in Taiwan.¹⁹³ The movement of change showed, however, as the ruling coalition of the Koumintang was loosened during the administration of Chiang Ching-kuo.¹⁹⁴ In addition, in the 1980s, the rapid economic growth of Taiwan led to a rapid rise in the middle class. As a result, the demand for democracy was increasing, and it could have affected to Chiang's decision.¹⁹⁵ The second possible reason is international pressure. As the economic growth of the People's Republic of China made Taiwan internationally isolated, even the United States suggested human rights issues in Taiwan.¹⁹⁶ This might have forced Chiang to utilize democracy as a diplomatic solution.¹⁹⁷ The third reason is the personal

¹⁸⁸ Tzeng, 92.

¹⁸⁹ Tien, 9–11.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Andreas Martin Fulda, "Reevaluating the Taiwanese Democracy Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Opposition Organizations under Japanese and KMT Rule," *Critical Asian Studies* 34, no. 3, 357–394.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Chong-pin Lin and Man-jung Mignon Chan, "Taiwan and Mainland: A Comparison on Democratization," *World Affairs* 155, no. 3 (2017) 123–124.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Tzeng, *ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

preference of the need to end the dictatorship of Chiang Ching-kuo. Chong-pin Lin and Man-Jung Mignon Chan evaluated, “In the process of distributing the power of a country, it is hard to find any example where such a particular leader played a disproportionately important role in the world.”¹⁹⁸ According to them, Chiang could have made the decision to the displeasure of his father’s generation.¹⁹⁹ In addition, Chiang studied Socialism and Troikaism in his childhood in the Soviet Union. In fact, he had blamed his father as a traitor when his father destroyed the joint venture and attacked the Communist Party.²⁰⁰ Also, Chiang Ching-kuo lost his beloved lover to the Koumintang.²⁰¹ Therefore, although he occupied the seat of the authoritarian leader after his father’s death, he might have decided to discontinue authoritarianism himself.

Chiang Ching-kuo, finally, signed the abolishment of martial law on July 14, 1987, and officially announced it on the following day. The removal of the martial law of Chiang Ching-kuo also had a great impact on civil-military relations. First of all, military missions on politics and society were withdrawn.²⁰² As a specific example, civilian suspects no longer have to be tried in military courts.²⁰³ In addition, oversight of various publications and media has been transferred to the private sector.²⁰⁴ In this process, however, the influence of the military on politics and society was not removed all at once.²⁰⁵ In particular, there was the possibility of military rebellion and coup.²⁰⁶ In fact, Chiang Ching-kuo ordered the military to be ready to deal with emergencies caused by the abolition of martial law.²⁰⁷ It is suspected as an attempt by Chiang Ching-kuo to

¹⁹⁸ Lin and Chan, *ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ “Abeoji Jangjeseuwa Teul-eojin Jangjing-gwo Geuneun Naui Jeog-ida” [Chang Ching-kuo, Who Is Different from His Father Chiang Kai-shek, He s My Enemy], *Joongangilbo*, Oct 9, 2010.

²⁰¹ “John Chiang Says He Has Solved Mother’s Murder,” *Taipei Times*, Jan 27, 2006.

²⁰² Tzeng, 94.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

confirm military intentions.²⁰⁸ The military did not try to rebel against Chiang Ching-kuo or attempt to restore martial law using force, however.²⁰⁹ As Chiang Ching-kuo died of health problems and his power was transferred, however, the anxiety grew again.²¹⁰

3. Lee Teng-hui and the Efforts for Democracy

When Chiang Ching-kuo died, Lee Teng-hui (period of presidency: 1988–2000), then Prime Minister, became president. Lee Teng-hui was born in Taiwan and served as a Japanese soldier in imperialist Japan. He was an economist who studied in Japan and the United States. He joined the Koumintang in 1971 and later became a prime minister after being a minister of agriculture and mayor of Taipei. Though he had been the prime minister during the Chiang Ching-kuo regime, he was a native Taiwanese. This could have been a limiting factor in the voluntary submission of the military, given that the commanders of the military were mostly from the Chinese mainland.²¹¹

His regime settled down democracy more than Chiang Ching-kuo. In 1990, in Taipei, the Wild Lily student movement²¹² was happening, centered on college students. At that time, Lee Teng-hui was elected as a president through an indirect election in the parliament, and was scheduled to start his term on March 21, 1990. The students protested that the people should elect the president directly. Lee Teng-hui met the protesters on the first day of his tenure by inviting them to his building. At this time, Lee Teng-hui promised to commit to democracy. Lee Teng-Hui soon began reforms to transform Taiwan into a true democracy. Lee Teng-hui enacted “Additional Articles of the Constitution.” As a result, the first direct election of the national assembly took place

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid 95.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid., 103.

²¹² The Wild Lily student movement was a Taiwanese democratization movement in Taipei from March 16 to March 22, 1990. In a demonstration in line with the inauguration of Lee Teng-hui, who was elected by parliamentary indirect elections, students insisted that the people should elect presidents and lawmakers directly by election. The demonstration was boosted by the citizens and the number of participants increased to 22,000 according to Linda Chao & Ramon H. Myers, 1998. Lee Teng-hui invited protesters to the residence on March 21, the first day of his inauguration, and promised them the transition to democracy.

in 1991, and people elected the head of the local governors in 1994. Furthermore, in 1996, Taiwanese citizens directly elected president for the first time. In the 1996 election, Lee Teng-hui won a majority of the votes.

Though Lee Teng-hui was from the Koumintang, conservative military commanders did not see him as friendly because of his democratic reforms. At that time, Hau Pei-tsun, former chief of the general staff, was a prime minister. He publicly opposed Lee Teng-hui's policies.²¹³ In 1991, Lee Teng-hui ordered Gen Chiang Zonglin to be promoted as a first-grade general, but Hau Pei-tsun refused to follow him for one year.²¹⁴ Furthermore, in June 1991, it became clear that Hau had met with military leaders in November 1990 for a secret meeting.²¹⁵ This has led to suspicions that Hau was not only suspected of violating the President's military command, but also of simulating a coup.²¹⁶ Furthermore, in October 1992, Hau indirectly criticized and threatened Lee Teng-hui's policy, arguing that soldiers should oppose Taiwan's independence decision that could be made by president, saying "It is unthinkable that the commander of the armed forces of the ROC would take no action when seeing the name of the ROC being dropped."²¹⁷ Another problem was political intervention during the 1996 election. According to Tzeng's research, security officials maximized the Missile Crisis²¹⁸ against China for the election of Lee Teng-hui.²¹⁹

In spite of these big and small problems, however, there also had been positive changes in the realm of professionalism. First, the Taiwanese military did not try to make a direct political engagement. Tang Fei, who was then chief of the general staff in 1998, declared in the national assembly that "even if the state changes from ROC to Taiwan,

²¹³ Ibid., 111.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 112.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Fravel, 63.

²¹⁸ This is a series of missile tests conducted by the PRC from March 8 to March 15 off the Taiwanese coast to influence the 1996 presidential election in Taiwan.

²¹⁹ Tzeng, 146–147.

the military will comply with the constitution.”²²⁰ Chiang Chung-ling, then a defense minister, repeatedly said the military would maintain loyalty and political neutrality to the president.²²¹ In addition, since 1993, active officers have not joined the Koumintang.²²² In October 1993, a new law prohibited certain political parties from operating in the military.²²³ In addition, the active officers have ceased to participate in civilian government.²²⁴ The military still actively engaged in the security area, however.²²⁵ Active officers occupied the upper level of the ministry of national defense and participated in the national security council and the national security bureau.²²⁶ Also, reserve officers were actively involved in making defense policies.²²⁷

Civilian control of the military situation was more difficult. The prime minister, who was a reserve military officer, interfered with the president’s military control. Though, in Taiwan, the first civilian defense minister was appointed in 1990, he could not function properly because of the tremendous resistances of military commanders.²²⁸ Also, military-related policies were made by active officers themselves or reservists.

Taiwan experienced the Kaohsiung Incident and the Wild Lily student movement, but no democratic struggle has taken place by the majority of the population nationwide. Therefore, it seems that the perception of the need for democratization of society has not spread evenly. Therefore, some military members did not favorably see the changes in civil-military relations and think that changes in civil-military relations were inevitably required now. Furthermore, though the military did not actively accept democratic changes in civil-military relations, they did not need to worry about the possibility of great resistance of the people like the South Korean military.

²²⁰ Fravel, 66.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid., 67.

²²⁴ Ibid., 66.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Tzeng, 112.

4. Chen Shui-bian and the First Regime Change

In the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian (period of presidency: 2000–2008) was elected as president. His election was a monumental event in the history of democracy in Taiwan. Although Lee Teng-hui is an indigenous Taiwanese, he came from the Koumintang. Chen Shui-bian, however, was a human rights lawyer who defended the suspects in the Kaohsiung case and later joined the Democratic Progressive Party. In addition, he officially supported Taiwanization.²²⁹ This policy was expected to be in conflict with the military, which had a deep relationship with the Koumintang. In this situation, Lee Teng-hui's efforts helped to secure stable control for Chen Shui-bian.²³⁰

Just before Chen Shui-bian's inauguration, Lee Teng-hui gave instructions to General Tang Yaomin, a chief of general staff.²³¹ Tang gave a video to the whole military saying that the military would be loyal to the new government.²³² Also, Lee Teng-hui asked Tang Fei, who served as a minister of defense in his regime, to serve as a prime minister in the Chen Shui-bian government.²³³ These measures may have played a significant role in the military's stable early relationship with the regime of Chen Shui-bian.²³⁴

This positive relationship did not last long, however. Chen Shui-bian's regime had difficulty controlling the security institutions.²³⁵ Some aides of Chen said "In fact, fifteen percent of those working at security institutions are not loyal to Chen Shui-bian, but rather loyal to Beijing."²³⁶ In the early days of Chen Shui-bian's administration, a large number of air force pilots resigned and became civilian pilots, causing a major

²²⁹ Wei-chin Lee, "The Greening of the Brass: Taiwan's Civil-Military Relations since 2000," *Asian Security* 3, no. 3 (2007): 209.

²³⁰ Tzeng, 152.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid., 153.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Lee, 210.

²³⁶ Ibid.

problem in air power.²³⁷ Furthermore, in 2003, a guest lecturer ridiculed the President at a seminar in the military, with hundreds of active officers applauding.²³⁸ These events indicate a problem with the control of the military by Chen Shui-bian.²³⁹

In addition, soft coup²⁴⁰ incidents took place in 2004. The first incident occurred on March 19, 2004, the day before the presidential election. Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu were shot by an assassin during an election campaign stop in the Tainan area. As a result, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu were injured and hospitalized, but they were not critical. In the presidential election the following day, Chen Shui-bian succeeded in re-election by about thirty thousand votes. In this case, defense minister Tang Yao-min was accused of attempting to assassinate Chen Shui-bian with generals from the Koumintang.²⁴¹ Eventually, however, the case investigation concluded that an assassin, Chen Ching-hung, was the sole cause. Another suspicion of soft coup²⁴² activity was raised at the end of 2004 from Chen Shui-bian.²⁴³ At that time, Chen Shui-bian supported election of his party's parliamentary candidates.²⁴⁴ He insisted, "The retired generals persuaded active generals to resign or hospitalize, creating a sudden command void and creating a military crisis."²⁴⁵ Chen Shui-bian did not take any legal action against them, however.²⁴⁶

Despite these difficulties, however, there had been important changes in civil-military relations during the reign of Chen Shui-bian. First, in January 2000, parliament

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ On March 19, 2004, the day before the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan, the attempted assassination of Chen Shui-bian, who was then president, took place. In this case, he was injured and hospitalized, and was elected on the next day by about 30,000 votes.

²⁴¹ Tzeng, 157.

²⁴² During the 2004 parliamentary election campaign, Chen Shui-bian argued that major military generals wanted to challenge his command and authority by inducing a security vacuum by hospitalizing or applying for a resignation.

²⁴³ Lee, 211.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

passed a law to reform the military structure.²⁴⁷ According to this law, the commanding power of the military changed from the chief of general staff to the defense minister.²⁴⁸ The defense minister had also been given the authority to report directly to the President.²⁴⁹ In addition, the ministry of defense had to be monitored by congress.²⁵⁰ In detail, the law stipulated that the ministry of national defense should allow a third of its employees to be civilians and that one of the two vice ministers should be a civilian.²⁵¹ Second, Chen Shui-bian regulated the military intelligence bureau to act in accordance with legal procedures and report its activities regularly to parliament.²⁵² The third change was the expansion of the NSC. It allowed the President and his civilian staff to plan and control defense policy.²⁵³

As a result, civil-military relations in Taiwan have gone through difficulties but have moved toward democracy. In terms of the professionalism of the military, some of the former Koumintang soldiers acted against the president.²⁵⁴ The Taiwan military generally accepted its Taiwanese independence policy that had been strongly opposed by the Koumintang, however by adjusting the level appropriately.²⁵⁵ “The mission of the armed forces is to protect the island of Taiwan.”²⁵⁶ Considering that the majority of the military commanders were from Koumintang at the time, it can be seen that Taiwan’s professionalism had developed.

In terms of civilian control of the military, Chen Shui-bian improved the legal procedures for civilian control of the military and institutionalized military intelligence agencies. He appointed the civilian defense minister only three months before his

²⁴⁷ Tzeng, 151–172.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

retirement, however.²⁵⁷ In addition, a third of the staff of the ministry of national defense were appointed as civilians, but many civilian positions were filled with reserve military officers.²⁵⁸ Furthermore, President Chen Shui-bian underwent two soft coups during his term. These suggest that he had a limitation to actually control the military.

During the reign of Chen Shui-bian, overall civil-military relations in Taiwan gradually developed toward democratization, but Chen Shui-bian, a leader, had considerable difficulty in controlling the military. In particular, Chen Shui-bian himself said that a soft coup happened. It shows that it was not easy for the civilian leader to control the military. Taiwan's dictatorship was not pressured by the resistance of millions of people. As a result, the military did not have a strong need for democratization or fear of the people. This could have contributed to the soft coups or ridicule of the civilian leader who did not fit the military's view.

B. CHANGES IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION

This chapter analyzes the changing of civil-military relations of Taiwan during democratization, using Narcis Serra's theoretical analysis framework and the historical background introduced in the preceding chapter. In the literature review, Serra argues that

democratic transition occurs when democratically elected civilians end military intervention in the policy making process, because the military may themselves cease to intervene in, or the military privileges may be removed by civilian governments, and democratic consolidation occurs when elected civilian governments can establish and implement military and defense policies, and when the government is able to supervise the military whether the policies are properly implemented.²⁵⁹

According to this, the democratic transition in Taiwan can be categorized as beginning during Lee Teng-hui's regime. Lee Teng-hui's regime had made it difficult for the military to intervene directly in politics as in the past. In 1993, the active soldiers were banned from the Koumintang party as part of larger regulations that prevented the

²⁵⁷ Tzeng, 173–198.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Serra, 27–28.

military from holding membership in certain political parties.²⁶⁰ The regime also transferred all active military officers who worked in the civilian government back to the military.²⁶¹

The democratic consolidation can be categorized as occurring during the Chen Shui-bian regime. The Chen Shui-bian regime took legal actions to allow civilian governments to effectively control defense policies. The command structure of the military had been unified by the ministry of national defense, and a third of the staff of the ministry of defense had been filled by civilian employees.²⁶² It also expanded the NSC's capabilities and allowed the President and his staff to plan and control defense policies directly.²⁶³

1. Democratic Transition Period—Lee Teng-hui Regime

First, the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis of Serra's model, is considered a middle tension. Lee Teng-hui took power after the long-lasting Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo regimes. Lee Teng-hui joined the Koumintang in 1971 and served as minister of agriculture and prime minister of Taipei. Such a Koumintang career could have been a factor that helped the military to make a positive relation with the regime. Lee Teng-hui was a native Taiwanese, however. Therefore, he may have felt a sense of heterogeneity with the heads of the military, who are mostly from the Chinese mainland.²⁶⁴ In addition, he pursued relatively stronger democratic reforms than Chiang Ching-kuo. This would have created a tense relationship between him and the military. To be specific, Hau Pei-tsun, then prime minister of the Lee Teng-hui regime, former chief of the general staff, publicly objected to Lee Teng-hui's policy.²⁶⁵ Lee Teng-hui refused to promote General Chiang Zonglin as a first-grade general because of Chiang's

²⁶⁰ Fravel, 66–67.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Tzeng, 151–172.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 103.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 111.

secret meeting with other military generals.²⁶⁶ Chiang had also opposed and threatened Lee Teng-hui on an official stage, saying, “It is unthinkable that the commander of the armed forces of the ROC would take no action when seeing the name of ROC being dropped.”²⁶⁷ In addition, in the 1996 election, major military leaders tried to inflict negative political damage to Lee Teng-hui by using a security crisis against China.²⁶⁸ Nevertheless, during the Lee Teng-hui regime, the military did not engage in direct physical action. Considering all these actions, its level of conflict could be assessed as moderate.

Next, look at the control of the military axis, which is the horizontal axis. First, in 1993, all active soldiers withdrew from the Koumintang, and the law prohibited certain parties from participating in the military.²⁶⁹ It also prohibited active military personnel from participating in civilian government except in the security area.²⁷⁰ Considering this, it can be seen that the control of the military had been slightly improved as a whole, although there had been conflicts like that of Hau Pei-tsun, then prime minister, former chief of the general staff, who objected to and resisted the regime.²⁷¹

The last is the professionalism axis, which is the second horizontal axis. The leaders of the military had secret meetings with Hau Pei-tsun, then the prime minister and formerly chief of the general staff, in which participants were suspected of planning for a coup.²⁷² They also inflated the military crisis against China during the election to influence the regime.²⁷³ Tang Fei, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, declared that the military would defend the Constitution even as the nation’s character changed, however, and Chiang Chung-ling, defense minister, declared that the military would remain loyal

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 111–112.

²⁶⁷ Fravel, 63.

²⁶⁸ Tzeng, 146–147.

²⁶⁹ Fravel, 66–67.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Tzeng, 111–112.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid., 146–147.

to the President and maintain political neutrality.²⁷⁴ In addition, all active soldiers were withdrawn from the Koumintang systematically and could not participate in civilian government except in the security area.²⁷⁵ This shows that professionalism had increased considerably.

2. Democratic Consolidation Period—Chen Shui-bian Regime

First, the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis of Serra's model, is considered continue middle tension. Overall, the military did not oppose the civilian government from using military force during the regime. In addition, they partly accepted the policy changes required by the civilian government and tried to minimize friction. Shortly after Chen Shui-bian's regime, however, a large number of air force pilots applied for discharge, mocking the president in an official military lecture.²⁷⁶ There were also two soft coup cases suspected of intervention by the military.²⁷⁷ This indicates that their tense relationship had not been greatly mitigated.

Second, look at the control of the military axis, which is the horizontal axis. Chen Shui-bian gave the commanding power to the Ministry of Defense for civilian control.²⁷⁸ It also gave the minister of defense the right to report directly to the President.²⁷⁹ In addition, he made the system whereby congress could monitor the ministry of defense and the military intelligence bureau on a regular basis.²⁸⁰ The NSC also expanded its organization to allow the President to plan and implement Taiwan's own defense policies.²⁸¹ In addition, the president appointed a genuine civilian defense minister and ordered one-third of the staff of the ministry of defense to be filled with civilians.²⁸²

²⁷⁴ Fravel, 66.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Lee, 210.

²⁷⁷ Tzeng, 157 and Lee, 211.

²⁷⁸ Tzeng, 151–172.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

Despite these efforts, however, the genuine civilian minister of defense, whom he appointed, was not able to carry out any practical activities, and the civilian personnel of the ministry of defense were also filled with reservist soldiers.²⁸³ Also, as the two soft coup cases show, the civilian regime had difficulty in controlling the military. Even then, the presidential staff complained that some of the military seemed more loyal to the mainland than the president.²⁸⁴ In this regard, the control of the military axis can be considered slightly increased.

The last remaining axis is the professionalism axis, which is the second horizontal axis. At that time, the main positions of the military were filled by members of the former Koumintang party, but they tried to accommodate the changes in defense policy required by the regime. In particular, in response to the civilian government's Taiwan independence policy, the military declared its mission to protect "the island of Taiwan" rather than the Republic of China.²⁸⁵ A large number of Air Force pilots had left the military as a backlash against Chen Shui-bian, however, and some higher ranking military members were suspected of involvement in two soft coups.²⁸⁶ Considering this, the professionalism axis can be considered to have risen slightly.

These changes in civil-military relations during democratization in Taiwan are detailed in Figure 3.

²⁸³ Ibid., 173–198.

²⁸⁴ Lee, 210.

²⁸⁵ Tzeng, 151–172.

²⁸⁶ Lee, 210.




Figure 3. Changes in civil-military relations during democratization in Taiwan.²⁸⁷

C. MAJOR IMPLICATIONS

As a result of democratization, Taiwan's civil-military relations have suffered difficulties while making a significant change during the democratization process. Chiang Ching-kuo abolished the martial law in 1987, and in 1990, Lee Teng-hui became the first native Taiwanese president. He tried to make the military be an independent army from the Koumintang and excluded soldiers from the civilian administration.²⁸⁸ Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000, when he was the first in Taiwan to replace the Koumintang regime. In an effort to institutionalize the civilian control, he tried to unify the military command as a minister of national defense, expand the functions of the NSC, and appoint a civilian defense minister.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ Adapted from Serra, 64.

²⁸⁸ Fravel, 66–67.

²⁸⁹ Tzeng, 151–172.

In the process, however, military and former military key figures publicly opposed the President's policies and mocked the President. In particular, during the Chen Shui-bian regime, there were two soft coup cases suspected of involvement in the military.²⁹⁰ This suggests that the process of democratization in Taiwan has not progressed steadily.

Applying Serra's theory of military reform, the conflict level axis remained in the middle state, and the control of the military axis rose slightly in both regimes. And the professional axis seems to have risen considerably in the Lee Teng-hui regime, but only slightly in the Chen Shui-bian regime.

These changes are related to the characteristics of the democratization process in Taiwan. In Taiwan, in 1979, the Kaohsiung Incident happened. Hundreds of citizens demanded democracy and more than a hundred citizens were arrested by the police. This was a meaningful event that caused the desire for democratization in Taiwan, which was under the control of martial law for a long period of time. After this event, however, the democratization movement, in which the majority of the people participated, did not progress smoothly or steadily. Although Chiang Ching-kuo ended martial law in 1987, there seemed to be other reasons for his decision to accept democracy besides the pressure of citizens, such as diplomatic pressure or personal preference.²⁹¹ After him, Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese who favored democracy, became the president by an internal decision of the Koumintang.²⁹² The Wild Lily student movement happened at the beginning of the regime, but participants were mainly Taipei's college students. During the reign of Lee Teng-Hui, there was no nationwide democratization movement. Therefore, this made an environment that allowed Taiwan's military to cope with the civilian leader's democratic policies relatively flexibly without fear of the civilian movement.

²⁹⁰ Lee, 210.

²⁹¹ Tzeng, 92.

²⁹² According to Fulda, the Koumintang treated native Taiwanese as inferior second-class citizens and used them as a means to discriminate and advance into the mainland. During the dictatorship of the Koumintang, in Taiwan, mainlanders monopolized almost all the politics, society and power within the country. (Source: Fulda, 357–394.)

These changes in Taiwan's civil-military relations are also related to the effectiveness and the incentives that the new civil-military relations theory emphasizes. First of all, in the perspective of effectiveness, the Lee Teng-hui regime changed into an offensive military strategy to defend the island of Taiwan.²⁹³ This can be regarded as a realistic military strategy, realizing that the Taiwanese military cannot occupy the Chinese mainland themselves. Taiwan could not obtain the necessary weapons, however, due to the negative attitude of the United States concerned about China's opposition and the conflict with the Koumintang in parliament during the Chen Shui-bian regime.²⁹⁴ This limited Taiwanese military effectiveness. Looking at the incentives, Lee Teng-hui, although from the Koumintang, was a native Taiwanese. He, therefore, did not feel the necessity of a "single China" principle and the strong public security politics that the Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo regimes had maintained. Chen Shui-bian was also a former human rights lawyer and participated in the Kaohsiung Incident. He saw the necessity of democratization and the necessity of change in civil-military relations. The relationship with China led to conflicts as the Taiwan government pursued an independence policy. Therefore, external threats at this time were high and internal threats were stable, but there was always a risk of military challenge. Therefore, there was a middle state incentive to change civilian relations for civilian leaders, but it was not an optimistic environment.

²⁹³ Jae Yeop Kim, "Taiwan's Defense Reform: Background, Process, and Assessment," *China & Soviet Research* 35, no. 2 (2011): 141–173.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

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V. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

A. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN'S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION

The two countries have experienced considerable changes in civil-military relations in terms of their institutions. The militaries of the two countries had a powerful influence on politics and society before democratization. In particular, soldiers entered the civilian administration and the parliament as active soldiers or reservists, and chose the main policy of the state. Furthermore, the military themselves decided and enforced their policies.

When democratization began in both countries, the civil-military relations also went through a process of democratization in the vortex of change. In the process of change, the two countries institutionalized civilian control of the military. Specifically, policies established control of the military for a civilian president and have made it possible for the parliament to monitor the military. In addition, active soldiers have been unable to operate in civilian governments in areas except the security area. The influence of the reservists of the government and the congress have significantly diminished. Also, the soldiers themselves have also improved professionalism to try to accommodate the changes demanded by civilian leaders and regimes. In particular, the military in both countries did not oppose the civilian regime by using direct military power during the democratization process. This commonality is also reflected in results of applying Serra's theory. In both countries, the control of the military axis and the professional axis appear to improve overall in both the democratic transition and the democratic consolidation period.

B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN'S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION

First, in South Korea, President Kim Young-sam took office in 1993 as the first genuine civilian since the long military regime. President Kim Young-sam removed Hanahoe, a private organization that had a strong influence in the military after his

inauguration,²⁹⁵ and conducted a survey of military personnel and corruption that had been hidden.²⁹⁶ In addition, he arrested Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, former Presidents, and generals who took power by raising coups and massacring innocent civilians in Gwangju.²⁹⁷ Also, he banned the military intelligence agency's civilian inspections that had been done in the past.²⁹⁸ In the meantime, the military did not engage in open opposition or armed resistance. The South Korean military conforms to the instructions of the civilian president.

In the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun presidential regimes, civil-military relations worsened. Although Kim Young-sam was the first genuine civilian elected after a long period of military dictatorship, he was elected president as a candidate of the political party (Democratic Liberty Party) including military dictatorship groups such as Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. As a democratization activist, however, President Kim Dae-jung had been on the other side of the military regime during his entire life, and was almost killed by the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan regimes. President Roh Moo-hyun also took the lead in the struggle for democratization as a human rights lawyer. As a congress member, he opposed Kim Young-sam's political merger with the military dictatorship group. He also took a lead and became a star in criticizing the military dictatorship at the parliamentary hearing in 1988. Furthermore, from a policy perspective, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun attempted to solve the North Korea problem through dialogue, exchange and cooperation. These parts could be a conflicting element between the civilian government and the military.²⁹⁹ The military, however, as during Kim Young-sam's regime, chose to adapt rather than resist the civilian regime. The military accepted the government's policy of reconciliation with North Korea and implemented measures to alleviate tensions with North Korea.³⁰⁰ In particular, the military suspended psychological warfare, such as the broadcasting using loudspeakers to

²⁹⁵ Croissant, 372.

²⁹⁶ Cho, 292.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Cha, 208.

²⁹⁹ Cho, 376.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

North Korea, which even caused a criticism of the military from conservative medias in South Korea. The military also accepted control of the civilian government through an expansion of the NSC and monitoring function by the National Assembly.³⁰¹ Of course, there were some noises of opposition to this process, but they were only complaints expressed among some military members and leaked through media and reserve organizations. The personnel or organization of the military did not officially act against government policies or express their opposition to the public.

In Taiwan, however, a different image often appeared. After a long period of the reign of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo in Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, who gained power in 1988, transformed the military from the Koumintang army into a national army. He passed laws that prevented certain political parties from directly controlling the army, and prevented active soldiers from taking positions in the Koumintang.³⁰² In addition, active soldiers could not operate in the civilian government except for security-related areas.³⁰³ Also, he appointed the first genuine civilian minister of national defense in Taiwan's history in 1990.³⁰⁴ As for Lee Teng-hui's reform policies, though the military did not mobilize direct military force, they caused considerable resistance. The former joint chief of staff, Hau Pei-tsun, was then prime minister. He refused to implement the military reform policies, and criticized the policies to the public.³⁰⁵ He also had a secret meeting with incumbent military leaders.³⁰⁶ It is doubtful, however, that he intended to start an actual coup.³⁰⁷ The Taiwanese security agencies had also pushed for a security crisis to intervene in the presidential election in 1996.³⁰⁸

The first regime change took place in Taiwan through the 2000 presidential election. Chen Shui-bian, a former Democrat and a human rights activist, was elected

³⁰¹ Kuehn, 16.

³⁰² Fravel, 66–67.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Tzeng, 111–112.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 146–147.

president. His election was able to bring a crisis to civilian relations than Lee Teng-hui's regime period. Chen Shui-bian was a human rights lawyer who had fought for the democratization movement since the Kaohsiung Incident, and he also wanted to make Taiwan an independent country from China.³⁰⁹ These were repulsive factors for the people who had been ruled by the Koumintang for a long time. In fact, when Chen Shui-bian took power as president, pilots who were relatively free to change jobs among the soldiers applied for retirement.³¹⁰ This not only hurt Taiwan's air power, but also put political pressure on the president. In addition, the Taiwanese military publicly ridiculed the president during an official event.³¹¹ Above all, the Taiwan military was suspected of involvement in two soft coup events during the reign of Chen Shui-bian. One time, the military were suspected of trying to assassinate Chen Shui-bian, and another time, the high-ranking military generals were suspected of denying their duties as a group and trying to hinder the president's performance.³¹²

Why did this difference appear? The origin of the democratization movement in South Korea can be found even before the foundation of government. The Donghak Peasant Movement, which occurred during the Chosun dynasty in 1886, did not have a specific institutional slogan of democracy, but hundreds of thousands of peasants participated nationwide in the battle against the government forces. The peasants advocated abolition of the class system and equality and human rights. After this movement, the Independent Association, which was established in 1896, organized the People's Mass Meeting to spread democratic values such as freedom, human rights, equality, division of powers, and establishment of a parliamentary system.³¹³ Later, in 1919, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea instituted a democratic and republican constitution according to the influence of the Independent Association.³¹⁴ After the foundation of the country, the April 19th Revolution occurred in 1960 and

³⁰⁹ Lee, 209–211.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid. and Tzeng, 157.

³¹³ Hyung-ik Choi, *ibid.*

³¹⁴ Ibid.

hundreds of thousands protested against an authoritarian regime. Although the military coups and dictatorial regimes continued for decades after the revolution, the democratization movement continued in the meantime. Especially, in the 1970s, rapid economic growth led to the expansion of a middle class, and the authoritarian rule sparked dissatisfaction within the society and caused a commitment to a democratization movement.³¹⁵ In particular, tens of thousands of protesters participated in the Bu-ma Demonstrations in 1979 in the Busan and Masan areas, which resisted the dictatorship of the Park Chung-hee regime. This case is considered to have had a great impact on the fall of the Park Chung-hee regime. Also during the Chun Doo-hwan regime, the Gwangju Democratization Movement occurred in 1980, and hundreds of thousands of Gwangju citizens resisted the bloody suppression by the authoritarian regime and fought an armed struggle. In addition, a democratization uprising broke out in June 1987. Millions of citizens participated in the demonstrations nationwide and endeavored to end the dictatorship. On June 29, 1987, President Chun Doo-hwan accepted a direct presidential election system and the long-term military dictatorship ended.

The history of the South Korean democratization movement seems to have affected the civil-military relations during democratization. South Korean have fostered the value of democracy on their own, through a long-term democratic movement. Recognition of the importance of democracy reached a peak in the June Democratic Movement in June 1987, when millions of citizens protested against the authoritarian regime for one month. This change in perception has contributed to two major aspects in the South Korean military's acceptance of civil-military relations. First, the soldiers themselves became positive about democratization. The South Korean military has been a conscription system, and the lower-class officers (mainly lieutenants) and soldiers, who occupy the majority of the members, come to the military to perform military service obligations for a short period of time. These young people were able to see and listen and experience the democratization movement in society, and to hold the importance of democratization during military service. In addition, senior officers who had been in the military for a long time were also able to have a chance to change their perceptions

³¹⁵ Chang-jip Choi, *ibid.*

indirectly through family, friends, or the media, although they did not participate in the direct democratization movement. This aspect has helped the military members voluntarily accept democratization of civil-military relations. The second aspect of change is the pressure on the democratization of the citizens. The main commanders of the military had watched for a long period of resistance against the military dictatorship. In particular, in 1980, citizens of Gwangju voluntarily organized an armed militia against martial law forces. On May 27, 1980, when the martial law forces suppressed the militia stationed in the Jeonnam Provincial Government Office, the militia resisted to the end, even though they knew they would not be able to avoid death. In addition, soldiers watched millions of civilians go out on the streets against the military regime in June 1987. Hence, major military commanders had to worry about the backward winds that could come upon them when they made decisions that countered democratic changes in civil-military relations. They had to take not just a power struggle with the civilian government, but a struggle with millions of citizens. Of course, in this situation, the military could use its own exclusive force to oppress the civilian government and citizens. Military commanders had to doubt whether their young subordinate members would obey their orders, however, because of the aforementioned factor. Furthermore, they also had to consider that their decisions would be at the expense of citizens' armed resistance, as in the past at Gwangju. This potential instability contributed to the decision of the main commanders of the military to accept rather than resist the democratization of civil-military relations. Especially, when the democratization movement ended military dictatorship and the perpetrators were punished, the military became aware of what a political intervention was leading to.

The process of democratization in Taiwan had differences from that of South Korea. First of all, there are diverse decisive factors for democratization with people's resistance such as international pressure and preference of political leaders.³¹⁶ Chiang Ching-kuo announced in December 1985 that he would not pass his power to his family,

³¹⁶ Chong-pin Lin and Man-jung Mignon Chan, "Taiwan and Mainland: A Comparison on Democratization," *World Affairs* 155, no. 3 (2017): 123–124.

and in July 1987 he ended the martial law that had lasted from 1947.³¹⁷ Also, the Taiwanese people were allowed to visit relatives in mainland China in October 1987, and the restrictions on the media were relaxed in January 1988.³¹⁸ The cause of why he actively embraced democracy is not known exactly.³¹⁹ Scholars generally suppose the following three, however: first, the increase of the citizens' democracy movement; second, the diplomatic isolation caused by the growth of China and the pressure on the improvement of human rights from the United States; and third, Chiang Ching-kuo's preference to stop his dictatorship. Unlike South Korea, these three factors together seem to have played an important role in Taiwan, rather than any one of them being overwhelming. Chiang Ching-kuo's series of reforms for democratization surprised even the key agents of the Koumintang at that time.³²⁰ After Chiang Ching-kuo's death, Lee Teng-hui, who was then the deputy prime minister, succeeded to power. Lee, a native Taiwanese, tried to eliminate the dictatorship and authoritarian elements that had remained in the country, and he continued the democratic reform so that the people could directly elect a national leader.

In Taiwan, the reason why the people's democratization movement did not, relatively speaking, actively happen was the strict authoritarian rule of the Koumintang. The Koumintang slaughtered tens of thousands of the native Taiwanese in 1947 by sending troops from mainland China in the February 28th Incident. The Koumintang declared martial law after withdrawing to the island of Taiwan in 1949. The martial law restricting the political freedom of the people guaranteed by the Constitution lasted for thirty-eight years until Chiang Ching-kuo lifted it in 1987. According to Fulda, the rule of the Koumintang was no different from the colonial rule of Japan for Taiwan.³²¹ The Kuomintang discriminated against Taiwanese as secondary citizens, and the

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Hung-mao Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan," in *Taiwan in a Time of Transition*, ed. Harvey Feldman and Michael Y. M. Kau (New York: Paragon House, 1988), 10.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Andreas Martin Fulda, "Reevaluating the Taiwanese Democracy Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Opposition Organizations under Japanese and KMT Rule," *Critical Asian Studies* 34, no. 3, 357–394.

modernization of the Taiwan islands was not meant for Taiwanese, but for their original purpose as a means to advance into the mainland.³²² During the martial period, the Koumintang restricted citizens' freedom in various ways.³²³ The Koumintang gave the press guidelines to the press, and they arrested the journalists.³²⁴ The Koumintang also prohibited citizens from participating in any kind of demonstration activities such as massive marches, street protests, and strikes.³²⁵ During the martial law period, the Taiwanese never elected their own presidents.³²⁶ The Koumintang even executed about 3,000 political prisoners during the martial law period.³²⁷ Therefore, since these political oppressions of the Koumintang gave fear to the opposition, the democratization activists in Taiwan controlled and restrained themselves not to make a national democratic movement.³²⁸ Tien argued that, compared to South Korean democrats, Taiwanese democrats held relatively mild struggles against the regime.³²⁹

Therefore, in Taiwan, the democratization movement did not actively take place compared with South Korea. In 1947, the February 28th Incident occurred before the Koumintang entered Taiwan in earnest. Hundreds of thousands of native Taiwanese protested against the repressive rule of the Koumintang. During this process, the Koumintang army slaughtered tens of thousands of native Taiwanese. This incident was a conflict between indigenous people and immigrant people who oppressed the indigenous. After this incident, a national democratization movement did not actively take place in Taiwan for a long time. Many years later, the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 made a big impact on the democratization of Taiwan, but only hundreds of people participated, and only in the Kaohsiung area. In 1990, the Wild Lily movement occurred, but the participants were mainly university students in a capital city.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Tien, 1–38.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid.

The democratization movement in Taiwan has a meaningful history. But it did not have a history of nationwide protest, in which a majority of the population participated, like South Korea. The difference between South Korea and Taiwan's democratization movement can help explain the unrest in Taiwan's civil-military relations during the democratization process. The comparative weakness of Taiwan's national democratization movement created a lack of stimulus to actively accept the democratization of civil-military relations in the military. Because the military members did not feel the need for democracy themselves, they did not need to actively accept changes in civil-military relations that could be disadvantageous to them. Also, there was little social pressure to force the military to make changes. In the process of democratization in Taiwan, there was no armed struggle of citizens or national resistance like South Korea, so that soldiers could consider that even if they rejected the change of civil-military relations, they would not face a serious crisis internally. In other words, since the perception of the necessity and inevitability of democratization itself seems to be lower, Taiwan's military had some maneuvering room for their actions.

By applying Serra's model, South Korea's conflict level axis decreased from the democratic consolidation period through the democratic transition period. This figure increased gradually in Taiwan through the democratic transition and consolidation periods, however. Furthermore, though both the professionalism axis and the control of military axis rose during the democratic transition and consolidation period in both countries, the rises in South Korea were higher than in Taiwan. Figure 4 compares the changes in civil-military relations during democratization in South Korea and Taiwan.




Figure 4. Comparing changes in civil-military relations during democratization in South Korea and Taiwan.³³⁰

³³⁰ Adapted from Serra, 64.

VI. CONCLUSION

On May 10, 2017, Moon Jae-in was elected president in the election in South Korea, after the impeachment of former president Park Geun-hye. He visited the ministry of defense on May 18, shortly after his election to the presidency, received reports from the military commander, and reaffirmed his security commitment. On May 30, however, Yoon Young-chan, the chief of the national communication department in the presidential office, said the ministry of defense deliberately missed a report about the additional deployment of four THAAD missile launchers. The presidential office surveyed key military personnel, including the then minister of defense, Han Min-gu, who was appointed by the former president. Given that the THAAD issue³³¹ was a sensitive issue in the security surrounding the Korean peninsula, the incident has brought a significant wave. After the dispute, President Moon Jae-in appointed Song Young-moo, a former chief of the navy, as minister of national defense, and Chung Kyung-doo, then chief of the air force, was appointed to the joint chiefs of staff. Significant changes are anticipated, given that both positions have usually been held by the army.

On May 20, 2016, Tsai Ing-wen was elected president in Taiwan. She became the first female president in Taiwan and the second Democratic Progressive Party president. Her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, who was from the Koumintang, had maintained a relatively friendly relationship with the military. Since Tsai was a woman in Taiwan, however, where every man was obliged to military service, she had no military experience. In addition, Tsai supported a policy of Taiwan independence that the military has not favored. After she took office, Tsai ordered the military to reform the military strategy and culture in August 2016. Tsai criticized the Taiwanese military for its improper remnants of the Koumintang army, and advised the Taiwanese military to re-

³³¹ THAAD is an acronym for “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense” and is a ballistic intercept missile system developed for U.S. military use. The debate began in South Korea in June 2014, when the USFK Commander said there was a need to deploy THAAD in South Korea to defend against missile attacks by North Korea. While China and Russia strongly oppose THAAD’s deployment on the Korean peninsula, Park Geun-hye’s government decided to deploy it in July 2016.

establish their reason for existence and the object to be countered.³³² After Donald Trump became president of the United States at the end of 2016, then President-elect Trump held a telephone conversation with president Tsai. This was the highest-level call made in thirty-seven years after the two countries broke official diplomatic relations. Tsai also officially traveled to the United States while visiting Latin America.

The internal and external security situations of these two countries are expected to have a considerable impact on civil-military relations. It is also likely that civil-military relations would affect them and their leaders' performances.

In this paper, Narcis Serra's theory of military reform has been used to analyze the development process of civil-military relations in South Korea and Taiwan during their democratization. The development processes of the two countries had both commonalities and differences. This study also looked at the history of the democratization movements of the two countries as a possible cause of the differences in their marches toward democracy.

The democratic transition of South Korea can be regarded as beginning with the election of President Kim Young-sam. He purged Hanahoe, a private organization that had a strong influence in the army, and punished former presidents and generals who caused military coups and slaughtered civilians.³³³ South Korea's democratic consolidation period occurred during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regimes. The two presidents created the NSC and expanded its capabilities to allow the President to effectively control defense policy.³³⁴ Also, they tried to increase the proportion of civilian employees in the department of defense.³³⁵ During the democratization of South Korea, the military actively accepted reforms rather than resisting the civilian presidents. The reason for the military's choice seems to be the influence over a long period of the extensive democratization movement in South Korea. Applying Serra's theory, the

³³² Minnie Chan, "Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen Orders Revamp of Military Strategy, Weapons Upgrade," *South China Morning Post*, August 25, 2016.

³³³ Cho, 292.

³³⁴ Kuehn, 16.

³³⁵ Kim, 126.

conflict level axis remained stable during the democratization period, and the control axis of the military gradually shifted toward civilian control. The professional axis shifted to increasing military professionalism.

Taiwan's democratic transition period can be classified as taking place during the Lee Teng-hui regime. He carried out reforms that changed the military from the Koumintang army into the national army.³³⁶ He also appointed the first genuine civilian defense minister in Taiwan's history.³³⁷ The democratic consolidation period can be considered to be the Chen Shui-bian regime. He created the NSC that allowed the president to control the defense policy, and allocated the ratio of civilian staffs in the department of defense by law.³³⁸ During this period, the Taiwanese military did not resist the civilian president directly by using military force, and tried to accept the policies of the civilian government. A high-ranking official from the military did not accept the civilian president's policy, however, and made a secret meeting with other generals.³³⁹ Furthermore, soldiers mocked the civilian president during an official event.³⁴⁰ In addition, two soft coups occurred.³⁴¹ Applying Serra's theory, while the control of the military axis and the professional axis increased gradually for civilian control and military professionalism during Taiwan's democratic transition and consolidation period, they were not higher than those of South Korea. Furthermore, the conflict level axis rather increased during both periods and did not approach a stable state like South Korea.

The difference in the democratization process between the two countries' civil-military relations seems to be due to the differences in the process of democratization between the two countries. In the case of South Korea, during the process of democratization, citizens voluntarily aided the national democratic movement against the authoritarian regime. Occasionally, civilians voluntarily armed themselves and fought

³³⁶ Favel, 66–67.

³³⁷ Tzeng, 111–112.

³³⁸ Tzeng, 151–172.

³³⁹ Tzeng, 111–112.

³⁴⁰ Lee, 210.

³⁴¹ Tzeng, 151–172, Lee, 211.

against military forces. Millions of citizens from across the country came out on the street every day and campaigned for democracy. South Korean dictators were forced to adopt democracy under the pressure of these citizens. This South Korean democratization movement not only made soldiers aware of the importance of democratization voluntarily, but also reminded them of the social pressure that they should bear if they accepted the democratization of civil-military relations passively. In the case of Taiwan, there was a voluntary democratization movement of citizens, but there were also other main factors such as international pressure and political leaders' preferences. The strict social controls of the Koumintang in Taiwan had limited citizens' voluntary democracy movements. This characteristic of the Taiwanese democratization process created a shortage of incentives that would allow the military to actively accept changes in civil-military relations that could have a negative effect on them. In addition, the Taiwan military did not worry too much about the storm from society after it had blown over, even if they accepted the change of civil-military relations passively. For these reasons, the Taiwanese military did not actively accept the democratization of civil-military relations as much as South Koreans.

This study is an area where prior research has made little progress. Therefore, this research can be a starting point in this field. In the past, many authoritarian countries have undergone and are undergoing a process of democratization. In the future, authoritarian or totalitarian nations like North Korea can also undergo a process of democratization. This study could contribute to analyzing the civil-military relations of such countries in the future.

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